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Abstract
Throughout the thesis, I study mathematical models that can help explain the dependency of
social phenomena in animals and humans on individual traits. The first chapter investigates con-
sensus building in human groups through communication of individual preferences for a course
of action. Individuals share and modify these preferences through speaker listener interactions.
Personality traits, reputations, and social networks structures effect these modifications and even-
tually the group will reach a consensus. If there is variation in personality traits, the time to reach
consensus is delayed. Reputation models are introduced and explored, finding that those who
can best estimate the average initial preference and who have the best knowledge to what the
optimal decision is for the group become the most reputable. If there is one individual, an informal
leader, who is stubborn, persuasive, reputable, and socially connected then the time to reach con-
sensus is reduced. The second chapter introduces a model for the emergence of play behavior in
animals. An individual-based model is proposed where organisms compete for resources in the
environment. Play is introduced as a frivolous behavior that increases energy use and the proba-
bility of dying. Simulations show that play behavior becomes fixed in the population and the time
spent playing is maintained at a low rate in regardless of its costly nature. When play behavior is
directly functional by increasing foraging ability, it evolves quickly and the time individuals spend
playing increases, but eventually the population of players collapses and play disappears. Play
acts as a spiteful behavior in that playing individuals suffer a direct cost to their fitness, but also
results in players consuming more resources incurring a greater cost to other individuals in the
population through reduced probability of successfully foraging.
v
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Introduction
Chapter 1. To coordinate activities groups must have efficient strategies in place for consen-
sus decision-making. Recent theoretical work suggests that democratic, egalitarian, and shared
decision-making is often the most efficient way for dealing with both information uncertainty and
individual variation in preferences. However, many animal and human groups make collective
decisions through particular individuals, leaders, that have a disproportionate influence on group
decision-making. To address this discrepancy between theory and data, we study a simple, but
general, model that explicitly focuses on the time it takes to reach a consensus in groups com-
posed by individuals who are heterogeneous in preferences, certain personality traits (agreeability
and persuasiveness), reputation, and social networks. We also investigate the impact of different
group members on the consensus value to which the group eventually converges.
Chapter 2. Although play occurs in a wide variety of animals, models of the origins of play be-
havior are lacking. We propose a novel computational model exploring the evolution of non-social
frivolous play. Asexually reproducing semelparous animals can either rest or forage. Foraging oc-
curs when an organism is below an energy threshold. Success is determined by the combination
of skill and availability of resources, which declines over time but replenishes for each generation.
Play is introduced as a mutant strategy: a frivolous activity that uses energy, increases the prob-
ability of dying over resting, with no direct fitness benefit. We explore the conditions that allow for
the emergence of play behavior and the effects that playing has on the abundance of resources in
the environment.
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Chapter 1
Time to consensus in heterogeneous
groups and the benefits of leadership
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The following chapter is a reprint of a paper submitted for publication:
Gavrilets, S., Auerbach, J., and van Vugt, M. (in review). Time to consensus in heterogeneous
groups and the benefits of leadership. Proceedings of the Royal Society London B.
Abstract
To coordinate activities groups must have efficient strategies in place for consensus decision-
making. Recent theoretical work suggests that democratic, egalitarian, and shared decision-
making is often the most efficient way for dealing with both information uncertainty and individ-
ual variation in preferences. However, many animal and human groups make collective decisions
through particular individuals, leaders, that have a disproportionate influence on group decision-
making. To address this discrepancy between theory and data, we study a simple, but general,
model that explicitly focuses on the time it takes to reach a consensus in groups composed by
individuals who are heterogeneous in preferences, certain personality traits (agreeability and per-
suasiveness), reputation, and social networks. We also investigate the impact of different group
members on the consensus value to which the group eventually converges. We show that within-
group heterogeneity can significantly delay democratic consensus building. Our results thus imply
strong benefits of leadership particularly when groups experience time pressure and significant
conflict of interest between members (due to various between-individual differences). Overall, our
models shed light on why leadership and decision-making hierarchies are widespread, especially
in human groups.
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Introduction
All group-living animals, including humans, regularly need to coordinate their activities with group-
mates. For example, animal groups must decide on where and when to collectively eat, drink, rest,
and move (Boinski, 1993, Couzin et al., 2005). Such decisions can have important consequences
for group cohesion and the fitness of individual members. Thus, group living requires mechanisms
to engage in effective group decision-making. An inherent feature of both animal and human
groups is their heterogeneity. Some group members are perhaps better informed than others, for
instance, about the location of a foraging site, and there may be conflicting preferences among
group members on which site to go to. Understanding how groups aggregate information — while
accounting for variation in individual preferences and personalities — represents a big theoretical
and applied challenge across both the biological and social sciences.
Recent theoretical work in evolutionary biology suggests that democratic, egalitarian, and
shared decision-making is often the most efficient way for dealing with both information uncer-
tainty and between-individual variation in preferences (Conradt, 2012). This conclusion is in line
with theoretical models on swarm intelligence, “wisdom of crowds”, quorum seeking, and voting in
elections (Krause et al., 2010). However, some animal groups make collective decisions through
particular individuals – or leaders – that have a disproportionate influence on group decision-
making. For instance, in elephants, dolphins, killer whales, and ravens the most knowledgeable
group member often dictates group movement (Foley et al., 2008, King et al., 2009). Anthro-
pological research suggests that virtually all groups and societies have leaders guiding collective
decision-making in place, although they may be situational (Brown, 1991, von Rueden et al., 2014).
In modern human societies, decision-making hierarchies are ubiquitous: nations have politicians,
businesses have executives, and classrooms have teachers. In fields such as economics, social
psychology, organizational and political science, researchers have shown the benefits of decision-
making hierarchies (March and Simon, 1993, Mintzberg, 1979, Yukl, 2012).
So why are decision-making hierarchies ubiquitous in the real-world when theoretical models
(e.g., swarm intelligence, wisdom of crowds) favor shared, consensus-based decision-making pro-
cedures? The discrepancy between theory and practice was not lost in Conradt’s Conradt (2012)
review who noted that “an interesting question is why so many empirical studies report unshared
and dictatorial decision-making, while the models predominantly predict shared decisions. Obvi-
ously, the models are missing some aspects of the problem...”
There are at least three important factors which are absent or underdeveloped in existing mod-
els. First, variation in dominance, personality, or experience contribute to the formation of stable
hierarchies resulting in some individuals being more “influential” than others (King et al., 2009).
In fish, differences in temperament give rise to a relatively stable social structure in which leaders
move first thus coordinating movement (Harcourt et al., 2009). In non-human primates, physically
dominant individuals dictate group movement because they are more intimidating and autonomous
(King and Cowlishaw, 2009, van Vugt, 2006). People who are more stubborn and less agreeable
– and thus less willing to shift their position – are more likely to emerge as leaders (Gillet et al.,
2010, van Vugt et al., 2008, Judge and Bono, 2001). Further, behavioral genetics research shows
that such personality differences have a substantial heritable component (Judge et al., 2002), sug-
gesting that leader-related traits are maintained via frequency-dependent selection (Buss, 2009,
Johnstone and Manica, 2011, Nettle, 2006).
A second contributing factor to the emergence of leadership and hierarchy is time constraints.
Reaching consensus via a democratic process takes time which might be quite costly for groups
facing certain challenges. Human research shows that as groups face time pressure they move
from a shared to an unshared, hierarchical decision-making structure (Bavelas, 1948). In the
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Robbers Cave experiment, a classic psychological study on intergroup behavior during a summer
camp, Sherif et al. (Sherif et al., 1966) showed that when the two groups became aware of each
other’s presence they each appointed team captains. This is echoed by anthropological evidence
that egalitarian hunter-gatherer groups revert to a more hierarchical structure when swift action is
needed to deal with aggressive outgroups (Price and van Vugt, 2014).
A third, related factor conducive to the emergence of leadership and hierarchy is group size.
In larger groups, social inequalities tend to be greater, which results in differences in power and
influence between members (Tyler and Lind, 1992, Powers and Lehmann, 2014). In addition,
individuals in larger groups often have dispersed social networks. Establishing consensus via
shared decision-making will be harder in such groups as individuals cannot interact with everyone
else at the same time. Thus, deferring to a leader is an appropriate solution in large, dispersed
groups, provided that there are mechanisms in place that help groups decide which individuals
to follow. Reputation-building may be a key mechanism for leadership selection (Hardy and van
Vugt, 2006).
Our paper addresses the theoretical gap identified above using a simple, but general, model
that explicitly focuses on the time it takes to reach a consensus in groups composed by individuals
who are heterogeneous in personality traits, reputation, and social networks. Theoretical work
studying the time to consensus actually has quite a long history in mathematics and physics,
where it comes under the rubric of the voter model (Baxter et al., 2008, 2012, Blythe, 2010).
This important work has been ignored in the biological literature on group decision-making. In
its most basic version, individuals have opinions which can be specified by integers. Individuals
interact stochastically in dyads and upon an interaction one individual of the pair accepts the
opinion of their partner. Under certain conditions, the whole group converges on a single opinion
in finite time. Mathematically, the voter model is quite similar to the model of random genetic
drift in population genetics (Crow and Kimura, 2009), with the time to consensus in the former
corresponding to the time to genetic fixation in the latter. Literature on the voter model in general
is quite extensive (Clifford and Sudbury, 1973, Griffeath, 1994, Liggett, 1994, 1999). While most of
the earlier research focused on symmetric models with identical individuals, more recent work has
allowed for heterogeneity of individuals with respect to their personality traits and social networks
Baxter et al. (2008, 2012), Blythe (2010), Antal et al. (2005), Sood et al. (2008), Masuda et al.
(2010), Mossell and Schoenebeck (2005), Lafuerza and Toral (2013).
This work, however, has limited application to only some types of individual and group behav-
iors. Typically in voter models, (1) there is only a small number of discrete opinions (usually just
two), (2) individuals accept the opinion of their partner completely, (3) consensus is defined as
complete uniformity of opinions in the group, and 4) the focus is on very large groups. In contrast,
in real-life decisions such as group movement, preferences can vary continuously and individuals
can modify their preferences in the direction of their partner but are not always willing to accept
their opinion immediately (Boinski and Garber, 2000, van Vugt, 2006). Because complete con-
vergence of opinions would here take infinite time, it makes more sense to define consensus as
a state in which the differences in opinions have been significantly reduced (e.g., below a certain
threshold or a certain proportion of initial variation), rather than eliminated completely. The dy-
namics of the opinion convergence versus that of complete disappearance of variation in opinions
(“fixation”) proceed on different time scales (Baxter et al., 2012), with the former happening much
faster than the latter. [it takes more time to entirely eliminate variation in opinion than to reduce it
below some threshold.] Most theoretical work has focused on the time to “fixation” (but see David-
Barrett and Dunbar (2012)). Finally, experiments show that even very small groups (i.e fewer than
6–8 individuals) often switch from consensus to leadership (van Vugt and De Cremer, 1999) so
that the large group size limit usually used in the voter model may not be justified. These limita-
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tions of existing mathematical work imply that additional studies of biologically inspired models are
needed.
The next section has two parts. The first part focuses on the consensus value to which the
group eventually converges and on the time scale of this convergence. If the decision making is
delegated to a leader rather than made by a consensus, the time to make a group decision can be
significantly reduced. A natural candidate for a leader is an individual with the highest reputation
for the ability to make a “right” decision, that is, the least costly or most beneficial decision for
group members. The second part looks at the dynamics of the emergence of such a reputation.
Models and results
Consensus building
We consider a group of n individuals who differ with respect to their preferences, specified by scalar
numbers xi (i = 1, . . . , n and xi in (0, 1)). The individuals are motivated to reach a consensus
and are willing to change their preferences. We model the consensus building as a sequence
of “events”. At each event, a particular “listener”, say, individual i, listens to the argument of a
particular “speaker”, say, individual j, and then modifies their preference in the direction of that of
the speaker. Specifically, after the event the preference of the listener becomes
x′i = xi + αiβj(xj − xi), (1.1)
where parameter αi measures the listener’s willingness to change their opinion and parameter βj
the speaker’s ability to change the listener’s opinion. We will refer to αi as “agreeability” and to
βj as “persuasiveness”. The larger αi and βj are, the more significant change in the listener’s
preference after the event. We will treat αi and βj as individual-specific constant traits and will
allow for variation between individuals in these traits. It is natural to assume that all αi and βj are
between 0 and 1. Note that a typical setup in the voter model implies that αiβj = 1 so that the
listener adopts the preference of the speaker. In the David-Barrett and Dunbar (2012) model, both
members of the dyad change their preferences simultaneously to choose the middle preference,
so that αiβj = 0.5.
We will assume that at each event the listener is chosen randomly out of n group members.
The speaker is then chosen out of the n− 1 remaining group members uniformly randomly or with
probabilities dependent on some individual characteristics (such as reputation or social related-
ness to the speaker; see below). After a sufficiently large number of events, individual preferences
xi will converge to a consensus value, say x∗ (see Figure 1.1). We are interested in approximating
x∗ as well as in estimating the characteristic time to convergence τ .
We assume that on average each individual plays the role of listener µ times during the unit of
time. (For example, if group members are spatially dispersed, the encounter rate µ can be low.)
Our unit of time then corresponds to n/µ events. In the Supplementary Material (SM) we show that
the preferences xi will converge to x∗ exponentially in time. Therefore it makes sense to measure
the characteristic time to convergence τ using the mean lifetime of an exponential decay process
which in turn can be approximated by the maximum eigenvalue of a corresponding matrix. It also
makes sense to measure within-group variation in preferences using the mean absolute deviation
rather than standard deviation. The time for the variation in individual preferences to reduce to,
say, one tenth of its initial value will then be ln(10) × τ . Note that by definition τ does not depend
on the initial variation in preferences. Increasing the latter by a factor of k, will result in increasing
the time to reach a specific level of variation in preferences by a factor ln(k).
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Figure 1.1: Reaching consensus in a group of n = 8 individuals each with αi = βi = 0.25. The initial preferences are
spaced uniformly between 0 and 1. (a) The average dynamics of individual preferences (eight solid lines) and standard
deviation and average absolute distance to the consensus value x∗ = 0.5 (two dashed lines). (b) The distribution of
the time to consensus τ . Consensus time is defined as the time when the average absolute distance to x∗ drops below
1/10th of the initial value. 1000 runs, µ = 1.
Random dyads. Let the speaker-listener pairs be chosen completely randomly. We show in
the SM that in this case the consensus value x∗ can be approximated as
x∗ ≈
∑ βi
αi
xi,0∑ βi
αi
. (1.2)
This implies that the initial preferences xi,0 of individuals with the highest ratio of persuasiveness
βi to agreeability αi will have the highest weights in the consensus value x∗. We can say thus that
the most influential individuals will be those with the largest βi/αi ratio.
To evaluate the characteristic time to convergence τ , assume first that individuals do not differ
in agreeability (i.e that αi = α for all i). In this case, τ can be approximated as
τ ≈ 1
µ
1
αβ
(
1− 1
n
)
, (1.3a)
where β is the average persuasiveness in the group (see the SM). That is, the smaller individual
agreeability α and the smaller average persuasiveness β, the longer it takes to build a consensus.
This makes intuitive sense. Increasing the group size n increases τ but only weakly (less than by
a factor 2). Although larger groups require more dyadic interactions to build a consensus, more
“events” occur within a unit of time which reduces the overall effects of the group size.
When individuals differ in their agreeability (i.e. αi are different), the characteristic time to
convergence τ can be approximated as
τ ≈ 1
µ
1
αhβ
(
1− 1
n
)
(1.3b)
where αh is the mean harmonic agreeability in the group (α−1h =
∑
α−1i /n). Because individuals
with the smallest αi makes the largest contribution to αh, with variation in agreeability, the time
scale to convergence is largely controlled by the most “stubborn” group members. Again, this
makes intuitive sense. Larger groups are more likely to harbor individuals with more extreme
personality characteristics, and we expect αh to decrease with n to a limit. As a result, the time to
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Figure 1.2: The dependence of the time to consensus τ from simulations on group size n and variation in agreeability
αi and persuasiveness βi. Individual values of αi and βi were chosen independently with a uniform probability from
intervals of length ∆a and ∆b centered on 0.5. 5,000 simulations were run for each parameter combination with random
formation of dyads; initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
convergence will grow with the group size. Therefore, in this case τ will grow much faster with n
than in the case of equal αi. We conclude that the group size effect becomes sufficiently important
only in groups that have some individuals with very low agreeability. Our numerical simulations
show that approximations (1.3a) and (1.3b) somewhat underestimate τ .
Figure 1.2 illustrates our results numerically. In our simulations, individual values of αi and βi
were chosen randomly and independently with a uniform probability from intervals centered on 0.5
with width ∆a and ∆b, respectively. That is, parameters ∆a and ∆b characterize the maximum
spread of αi and βi. As predicted, the graphs grow approximately linearly only with the largest
value of ∆a while for smaller ∆a they saturate. Comparing the graphs corresponding to different
values of ∆b shows that the extent of variation in persuasiveness βi has not much effect on the
characteristic time to consensus τ .
Effects of reputation. Instead of assuming random encounters of speakers and listeners,
now assume that speakers are chosen according to their reputation or status. Let each individual
have a normalized reputation ρi (so that
∑
ρi = 1). Then given that individual i is the listener, let
the probability that individual j is chosen as the speaker be ρj/
∑
j 6=i ρj . Note that if all individuals
have the same reputation (ρi = 1/n), the last expression simplifies, to 1/(n − 1) as in our basic
model.
Assume first that individuals have equal agreeability (αi = α) and persuasiveness (βi = β), but
differ in reputation ρi. Then the consensus value is approximated as
x∗ ≈
∑
ρi(1− ρi)xi,0∑
ρi(1− ρi) . (1.4)
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Figure 1.3: The dependence of the time to consensus τ from simulations with variation in reputation only. Reputation
values ρi are chosen randomly from the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameter γ. All αi = βi =
0.5. 10,000 simulations were run for each parameter combination with formation of dyads weighted by reputation, and
initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1). µ = 1.
The largest influence on x∗ will be an individual with the largest value of ρi(1 − ρi), which will be
the individual with the largest reputation ρi (since
∑
ρi = 1).
Within the realm of our approximation, τ does not depend on the distribution of ρi if there is
no variation in αi and βi. Numerical simulations show that although this is not true in general, the
dependence is relatively weak, see Figure 1.3. In numerical simulations, reputation values ρi were
chosen randomly and independently from the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with concentration
parameter γ. (With γ = ∞, all individuals have equal reputation ρi = 1/n; with γ = 1, the
distribution of ρi is uniform; with small γ, most individuals have very low reputation while one or
maybe two individuals have large reputation.) Figure 1.3 shows an unexpected crossover effect:
groups with small variation in reputations ρi are more sensitive to the group size than groups with
high variation in reputation. Intuitively, in the latter case, consensus building is largely mediated
by the interactions between an individual with the highest reputation and the rest of the group who
have low reputation. The exact number of low-reputation individuals is not that important because
their opinions change in a similar fashion. We conclude that in large groups the presence of one
or few highly reputable individuals helps to achieve the consensus quicker but the overall effect is
small.
General case. Approximations and results for the case when individuals differ with respect to
agreeability αi, persuasiveness βi, and reputation ρi are given in the SM. The largest influence on
the consensus values is by the individual with the largest value of βiαi ρi. The time to convergence
is now controlled by the individual characterized by a combination of small agreeability and high
reputation resulting in the minimum value of αi1−ρi .
Multiple listeners. So far we have assumed that there was always a single listener per
speaker. With multiple listeners per speaker we expect that consensus will be achieved faster,
and these expectations are confirmed in numerical simulations reported in the SM. Our results
show with ` listeners the time to consensus reduces approximately by a factor 1/`, as one may
expect.
Social networks. So far we have assumed that each individual can directly interact with any
other group member. Now we assume that each individual interacts only with a limited number of
9
16 32 6410
15
20
25
 n
τ
 
 
k = 4
k = 8
k = n−2
k = n−1
(a)
16 32 6410
15
20
25
30
n
τ
 
 
p = 4/n
p = 8/n
p = 1
(b)
16 32 6410
15
20
25
n
τ
 
 
m0 = 4, m = 2
m0 = 4, m = 4
m0 = 8, m = 2
m0 = 8, m = 4
m0 = n−1, m = n−1
(c)
Figure 1.4: The average time to reach consensus for 3 different types of random networks. (a) Each group member
has the same number of connections k. (b) Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks with different probabilities of connectedness p.
(c) Preferential attachment networks with varying initial complete networks of size m0 and m connections for each
additional group member. No variation in personality traits (αi = βi = 0.5 for all n individuals). 5,000 simulations were
run for each parameter combination with random formation of dyads given by a corresponding social network; initial
preferences were drawn for a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
his/her specific social partners. Let as before at each event a single listener be chosen randomly.
But now we posit that for each listener, the speaker is chosen randomly and uniformly from the set
of social partners.
We investigated three different types of social networks assuming there is no variation in per-
sonality traits (Figure 1.4; see the SM Figure 1.16). Figure 1.4(a) shows the average time to
reach consensus for random networks where each group member has the same number k of
connections (i.e. social partners). Reducing the number of connections k increases the time to
reach consensus. Figure 1.4(b) corresponds to the case of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks (Prettejohn
et al., 2011) where each pair of individuals are connected with probability p. Results are similar
to the fixed connection model: decreasing p will decrease the number of connections in the group
and increase the time to consensus. Figure 1.4(c) corresponds to preferential attachment net-
works (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999). In building these networks we followed Prettejohn et al. (2011)
by starting with completely connected networks of m0 individuals and then choosing exactly m
connections for each additional group member (m < m0). Reducing the size of the initial com-
plete network m0 and therefore reducing the number of highly connected individuals dramatically
increases the time to reach consensus. This effect is similar to that found when reducing the num-
ber of connections in the other models. We conclude that reducing the number of social partners
can significantly delay the consensus.
Reputation dynamics
Our results above show that reaching a consensus can take significant time especially if there
is enough variation in agreeableness such there are a number of highly stubborn individuals in
the group, which would be more likely as group size increased. If this results in a large cost for
individuals and the group, then delegating the decision to a single individual (a leader) may be
a better alternative than attempting to reach a consensus. But who should be a leader? One
possibility is that this should be an individual who has attained the highest reputation for making a
right decision.
Assume that before the group takes a certain action, each individual expresses the best action
in their opinion. Assume that after the action the group knows what the best solution actually was.
10
Then each individual can be assigned a value c, which we will refer to as “capability”, measuring
their ability to make a good decision. We expect that individuals with higher than average capability
will increase their reputation ρ while those with lower than average capability will decrease it. This
can be captured by a simple model describing how individual reputation changes after each group
action:
ρ′i = ρi
ci
c
, (1.5)
where c =
∑
ci/n is the average capability in the group. An advantage of our approach is that the
above equation for ρ′i is identical to that of the one-locus multi-allele population genetic model of
natural selection whose dynamics are completely understood once the “capabilities” ci are speci-
fied (Ewens, 1979, Crow and Kimura, 2009).
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Figure 1.5: Reputation dynamics for different group sizes (averaged over 5,000 simulation runs). Initial reputations
were equal (ρi(0) = 1/n) and capabilities ci were drawn from a beta distribution with parameters (2,5).
Let individuals be ordered so that c1 > c2 > . . . cn, so that individual #1 has the highest
capability, individual #2 the second highest, and so on. Then from population genetic models, we
know that a single individual with the highest reputation ρi ≈ 1 (an “informal leader”) will emerge
on the time scale order
τ ∼ 1
c2 − c1 , (1.6)
with time being measured by the number of group actions. Figure 1.5 illustrates the dynamics of
reputations assuming that the individual capabilities ci stay the same for each action.
Note that the distribution of reputations that emerges corresponds to low values of γ (e.g.
γ = 0.1) in the previous section. In this case, the time to reach consensus takes longer for small
groups than for groups with a more uniform distribution of reputations, yet when group size gets
larger the time to reach consensus is quicker (see Figure 1.3).
In what kind of decision-making problems do group leaders play a role? Groups generally face
two kinds of cooperative challenges: (a) information tasks (e.g., where the group moves next) and
(b) distribution tasks (e.g., how group members share the meat). Arguably these problems require
11
1 4 8 12 160
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
α rank
sa
m
pl
in
g 
er
ro
r
(a)
1 4 8 12 160
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
α rank
sa
m
pl
in
g 
er
ro
r
(b)
1 4 8 12 160
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
α rank
sa
m
pl
in
g 
er
ro
r
(c)
Figure 1.6: Average sampling errors, (x˜i−xopt)2, for individuals attempting to estimate the average initial preference
xopt by randomly sampling n′ group mates in a group of size n = 16. Individuals are ranked by their relative agreeability
within the group from the lowest on the left to the highest on the right. Individual agreeability was chosen with a uniform
probability from the interval (0,1) and persuasiveness was fixed at 1. (a) n′ = 4, (b) n′ = 8, and (c) n′ = 16. 5,000
runs for each parameter combination with random formation of dyads and initial preferences drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval (0,1).
different kinds of leaders. Information problems require the selection of leaders with knowledge
and experience, whereas distribution challenges require fair and impartial leaders (Tyler and Lind,
1992). Yet these may not be the same individuals. Studies of leadership in hunter-gatherer soci-
eties show that leadership roles are often distributed across various individuals (von Rueden et al.,
2014). For instance, the Shoshone Indians have different leaders for hunting small game versus
large game (Price and van Vugt, 2014). The Cheyenne had different leaders for war and peace:
war leaders are younger, more aggressive, physically stronger, and of lower social class, whereas
peace leaders are older, physically less formidable, and from more prestigious families (Price and
van Vugt, 2014). Therefore there are at least two interesting possibilities for specifying capabilities
ci.
The leader is knowing. Assume that the optimum action for the group xopt is exogenously
specified (“information problems”). Without any loss of generality we can set xopt to 0. Assume
that each individual estimates xopt with an error which has zero mean and variance σ2i . Then the
individual’s “capability” can be defined as
ci = 1− sσ2i , (1.7a)
where s is a constant scaling parameter.
The leader is fair. Assume that the optimum action xopt is the one that is viewed as “fair”
by group members (“distribution problems”). A natural candidate for a fair action is the one that
minimizes the sum of squared deviations from initial individual preferences
∑
i(xi,0 − xopt)2. This
is the average, xopt =
∑
i xi,0/n, where xi,0 is the initial preference of individual i (Conradt and
Roper, 2003). Assume that each individual attempts to estimate the fair action, i.e. xopt, by
interacting with a random subset of n′ individuals modifying their preference according to our
model (eq.1). Let x˜i be the individual preference after this sampling process which the individual
offers as his opinion on the best group action. After the action is taken, group members know what
the optimum action xopt actually was. In this case, individual capability can be defined as
ci = 1− s(x˜i − xopt)2, (1.7b)
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where s is a constant scaling parameter.
In Figure 1.6 we illustrate how individual agreeability α affects the individual’s ability to es-
timate xopt using the sampling procedure outlined above. This Figure shows that there is an
optimal agreeableness when attempting to estimate the average preference. This optimum value
is relatively small. Intuitively, for very agreeable individuals their estimate of xopt will be close to
that of the last individual(s) they interacted with rather than the sampling mean. For very stubborn
individuals their estimate of xopt will remain close to their own initial preference xi,0. That is, for
distribution problems, where minimizing individual costs within the group is a priority, the most
effective individual is highly stubborn (but not the most stubborn). This result corresponds with
observations of contemporary leadership traits (Gillet et al., 2010, van Vugt et al., 2008, Judge
and Bono, 2001).
Discussion
Earlier evolutionary models of group decision-making (Couzin et al., 2005, Conradt and Roper,
2003) stressed that shared decision-making procedures often work best to achieve consensus,
because they minimize the costs of individual differences in preferences. This may be true in
theory, yet in reality unshared, hierarchical decision-making procedures are the norm in various
species, including humans (van Vugt and Anjana, 2010). Our paper investigates joint effects of
three factors that may favor hierarchical decision-making: within-group heterogeneity, time con-
straints, and group size. We primarily focused on evaluating the time to consensus in relatively
small groups (up to a few tens of individuals) that are heterogeneous in individual preferences, cer-
tain traits (agreeability and persuasiveness), reputation, and the number and type of their closest
social partners. Our models show that when allowing for individual differences there are signifi-
cant time costs associated with shared decision-making. Here we discuss the main findings of our
research and note some implications for theory and practice.
In our basic model, one individual (“listener”) interacts with another individual (“speaker”).
Group members are motivated to reach a consensus and, thus, are willing to modify their opinions
and/or preferences. As a result of an interaction, the listener shifts his preference in the direction
of that of the speaker with the extent of the shift being proportional to the listener’s agreeability
and the speaker’s persuasiveness. The listener is always chosen randomly from the group while
the speaker can be chosen randomly, or with a probability proportional to their reputation, or from
a subgroup of the listener’s closest friends. The time to consensus was defined as the time it
takes for the absolute differences between individual opinions to drop to a certain proportion (e.g.,
1/10th) of its initial value.
We found a simple approximation for the group’s final consensus value for several cases, and
our results show that the largest influence on the consensus value is from the individuals with
the largest value βiαi ρi where αi, βi and ρi are individual agreeability, persuasiveness, and reputa-
tion respectively. This implies that an individual who is, say, twice as persuasive, stubborn, and
reputable as another will have eight times more influence on the consensus value.
With respect to the time to reach consensus, we have shown that decreasing the average
persuasiveness or agreeability can significantly delay consensus. This is intuitive. Perhaps less
intuitive is that the within-group variation in persuasiveness does not have much effect on the
time to consensus, whereas within-group variation in agreeability can have a dramatic effect. One
stubborn individual can delay the time to consensus and multiple stubborn individuals can have a
significant impact on this time. Intuitively, if a group member is not persuasive enough to defend or
promote their opinion, their opinion will be largely disregarded and the group will converge on the
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weighted average of the opinions of the other individuals. However, if one is not agreeable, then
everybody else will converge on their opinion but this convergence can take a much longer time.
Time to consensus increases with the group size n but unless the group members vary highly
in agreeability, the increase is relatively small. While larger groups need more interactions to reach
a consensus, more interactions happen within the same time interval than in smaller groups. This
reduces the overall effect of group size. However with large variation in agreeability, τ increases
approximately linearly with n. This happens mostly because larger groups are more likely to have
one or more highly stubborn individual. The effects of the variation in reputation i on time to reach
consensus are small but convoluted. In smaller groups, increasing the variation in reputations
delays the consensus while in larger groups it speeds it up. These effects are relatively small
though.
When we modify the model so that there are multiple, say `, listeners per speaker the time to
consensus decreases by a factor 1/`. This result is intuitive as is the delay if individuals interact
only with a subset of close social partners/friends. We have shown this numerically using three
different types of networks common in the literature (Newman, 2003) and represent contemporary
organizational structures. For example, networks where everyone has the same number of con-
nections can be found in business teams or military units, and groups with random connections
are found in friendship networks and scientific collaborations (Lusher et al., 2012). We note that
the scope of one-to-many communication has of course increased tremendously in the information
age, and even more now with social media. This acts to reduce the time required for convergence
of opinions. Social media of course also have an opposite effect by making multiple alternatives
widely known.
Consensus can be achieved quickly if there is a single individual who is stubborn, persuasive,
and reputable (see Figure 1.7). Such an individual would be an ideal candidate for a leader if
decision speed is of primary concern. However the benefits of this speed may be outweighed
by the costs group members incur due to the consensus value being strongly biased towards the
value initially preferred by the leader. Our results (see Figure 1.6) predict that fair leaders, i.e. who
would be best in accounting for group members preferences, are highly, but not completely, stub-
born. This is seen today where contemporary leaders tend to score low on agreeable personality
scores (Judge et al., 2002).
Here we have studied the dynamics of consensus building on relatively short within-generational
time scales while assuming the existence of certain within-group variation. Our work is comple-
mentary with a number of recent papers which study evolutionary emergence and implications
of leadership (reviewed by Smith et al. (1999)). For example, Hooper et al. (2010) and Powers
and Lehmann (2014) study emergence of leadership and hierarchy as a way to solve collective
action problems. In their models group members accept leaders as a way to increase their in-
dividual benefits (even when leaders take a bigger share of the total reward). Johnstone and
Manica (2011) modeled the emergence of (genetically differentiated) leaders and followers in the
population composed by groups facing a coordination problem. They predict the emergence of a
small number of “stubborn” leaders while most of the population become completely “agreeable”;
consensus is prevented if there is more than one leader per group. This is complementary to
our approach in which the distribution of personality traits is already stable and consensus always
happens eventually. In other recent evolutionary models, leaders emerge as main contributors
(Gavrilets and Fortunato, 2014) or the only contributors (Gavrilets, 2015) in public goods games
with between-group conflict.
Our models and results shed light on why leadership is particularly common in our species, as
humans live in large heterogeneous groups (with much variation in personalities, motivations, in-
formation available, and preferences). Under such conditions the groups may benefit greatly from
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Figure 1.7: Effects of informal leadership. Two individual simulations contrasting the time to convergence for
(a) groups (n = 32) without a leader, and (c) with an informal leader. For the group without a leader, individual
agreeability was set to 0.5, persuasiveness was set to 0.5, there were no differences in reputation, every group mem-
ber was connected to each other, and initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
Individuals in the group with an informal leader had the same characteristics as the group members without a leader
except they were each assigned 4 random connections to other group members, while one group member, an informal
“leader”, had an agreeableness of 0.1, persuasiveness of 1, was connected to every other group member, and had
a reputation 10 times that of the other members. Histograms of the time to convergence for 200 simulations with the
above conditions without a leader (b) and with an informal leader (d).
having a hierarchical structure in place in which one individual, the leader, makes a decision on
behalf of the entire group. This hierarchical structure and reputation building as a knowledgeable
or fair leader could have been aided – or even made possible – by the evolution of language which
allowed individuals to affect/control preferences of many individuals at the same time with a low
cost.
Leadership has been shown to increase group performance and this may have been the case
for our ancestors, helping them better survive hostile environments as they migrated and popu-
lated the globe (van Vugt and Anjana, 2010). Understanding the emergence of leaders is also
important for understanding contemporary organizations. Whether in war, economics, or every-
day decision-making, the problems that leaders and leadership face today may not be so different
than what they faced before. Our results may provide an avenue to understanding how leadership
impacts group decision-making under various conditions and a possible mechanism for how they
emerge within the group. Finally, organizational scientists can potentially use these results to ex-
plore leader emergence in heterogeneous groups in order to facilitate group decision-making for
professional organizations, businesses, or militaries.
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Supplementary Information
Our basic model describes the changes in preferences xi in a group of n individuals (i = 1, . . . , n)
as a result of a stochastic sequence of events. Each events consists of an interaction between two
individuals one of which (the listener) changes their preference in the direction of that of the other
individual (the speaker). Specifically, we postulate that after an interaction between individual
listener i and speaker j, the preference of i becomes:
x′i = xi + αiβj(xj − xi), (S1)
where αi measures the listener’s agreeability and βj the speaker’s persuasiveness.
Let ψij be a random variable equal to 1 if the event includes individual i as a listener and
individual j as a speaker and let ψij = 0 otherwise. Let Ψ be a stochastic square matrix with
elements Ψij = αiβjψij . Let matrix S = I + Ψ− diag(ΨJ), where I is the identity matrix, J is the
column vector of 1’s, and diag(ΨJ) is the diagonal matrix with the elements of vector ΨJ . Note
that S is a stochastic matrix.Then the dynamics of vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)T can be described by a
system of stochastic linear equations
xt+1 = Stxt, (S2)
where t specifies the event number. Let E(S) be the expectation of S. The largest eigenvalue of
matrix E(S) is equal to 1. If the eigenvalue with the second largest modulus λ2 of matrix E(S) is
smaller than 1 in absolute value, then all elements of E(x) converge almost surely to a consensus
value
x∗ = vTx0,
where v is the left eigenvector of matrix E(S) corresponding to eigenvalue 1 (Tahbaz-Salehi and
Jadbabaie, 2008).
Assume first that each possible pair of individuals has an equal probability 1n(n−1) to be chosen
as a listener-speaker pair. In this case
E(S) = I +
1
n(n− 1)
(
αβT − nβ diag(α)) , (S3a)
where α and β are vectors of αi and βi, respectively. Then the expectation of the consensus value
is
x∗ =
∑ βi
αi
xi,0∑ βi
αi
, (S3b)
(see Figures 1.8, 1.10, 1.12).
Next assume that at each event, the listener is chosen with equal probability out of all group
members while the speaker is chosen out of remaining n − 1 group members with probability
proportional to their status ρi (
∑
ρi = 1). In this case ψij = 1 with probability 1n
ρj∑
j 6=i ρj
= 1n
ρj
1−ρi .
Now matrix E(S) is given by equation (S3b) with αi substituted by αi/(1 − ρi) and βi substituted
by βiρi. Correspondingly, the expectation of the consensus value becomes
x∗ =
∑ βi
αi
ρi(1− ρi)xi,0∑ βi
αi
ρi(1− ρi)
, (S4)
(see Figure 1.14).
Assume that interactions happen on a connected social network specified by an adjacency
matrix C with element cij = 1 if a pair with listener i and speaker j is feasible. Assume that a
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listener is chosen randomly with a uniform probability while the speaker is chosen randomly from
di =
∑
j cij potential speakers (e.g., neighbors or friends). In this case, for each feasible pair
ψij = 1 with probability 1ndi . Then one can find E(S) and x
∗ for any given adjacency matrix C.
In general finding or approximating the rate of convergence to τ is nontrivial (e.g. Boyd et al.
(2006) and Bajovic´ et al. (2012)). Assume that there are only n = 2 individuals i and j and that
each individual has an equal chance to be a speaker or listener. Let d = xi−xj . Then dt+1 = ξtdt,
where ξt takes values 1 − αiβj and 1 − αjβi with equal probabilities. In this case, the asymptotic
rate of convergence towards consensus is
λ =
1
2
(ln(1− αiβj) + ln(1− αjβi)) .
This is based on the fact that as t → ∞ the product ∏ti=1 ξi will have roughly t/2 terms 1 − αiβj
and t/2 terms 1− αjβi or, equivalently, t terms
√
(1− αiβj)(1− αjβi).
Note that because E(dt+1) = E(ξ)td0, the rate of convergence can be approximated as
λ = ln(E(ξ)) = ln(1− αiβj + αjβi
2
).
The two equations above are close if αβ  1.
With arbitrary n, perhaps the simplest approximation is to use the second largest eigenvalue
λ2 of matrix E(S). This corresponds to approximating the dynamics of the stochastic system
xt+1 = Stxt with the deterministic system xt+1 = E(St)xt. [From the above, we know that there is
a bias even with n = 2.]
Assume that individuals have equal agreeability αi = α but differ in persuasiveness βi. In this
case,
E(S) = I +
1
n(n− 1)α

β1 − nβ β2 . . . βn
β1 β2 − nβ . . . βn
. . . . . . . . . . . .
β1 β2 . . . βn − nβ
 ,
where β is the average of βi. The eigenvalues of E(S) are λ = 1 with multiplicity one and
λ = 1− αβ
n− 1
with multiplicity n − 1. Correspondingly, the characteristic time scale of convergence to the con-
sensus value can be approximated as
τ =
1
ln(1− αβn−1)
1
n
≈ n− 1
n
1
αβ
. (S5)
Note that the factor 1/n is present because our unit of time corresponds to n events. Figure 1.9
shows that this approximation works reasonably well in providing a lower bound on τ .
If individuals also differ in agreeability, one has to find the eigenvalues of matrix (S3b). The
characteristic equation of this matrix is known (e.g., Zhivotovsky and Gavrilets (1992)) which allows
one to approximate λ2. However we find that a simple approximation
τ =
1
ln(1− αhβn−1)
1
n
≈ n− 1
n
1
αhβ
. (S6)
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where ah is the harmonic mean of αi, does a pretty good job in providing a lower bound on τ (see
Figure 1.11).
If individuals differ only in their status ρi but not in agreeability or persuasiveness (αi = α, βi =
β) our approximation based on λ2 of E(S) predicts λ = 1 − αβn−1 and thus does not capture the
dependence of τ on the distribution of ρi. Nevertheless the approximation provides a reasonable
lower boundary on τ (see Figure 1.13). Figure 1.15 numerically explores the dependence of τ on
several parameters in more detail.
If individuals differ with respect to agreeability αi, persuasiveness βi, and reputation ρi and
speakers are chosen with a probability proportional to their reputation, then the time to conver-
gence is
τ ≈ 1
µ
1(
α
1−ρ
)
h
βρ n
(S7)
where
(
α
1−ρ
)
h
is the harmonic mean of αi1−ρi values and βρ is the average of βiρi values over the
group.
Multiple listeners. Assume that each speaker is listened to not by one but by ` listeners.
Figure 1.17 shows that with ` listeners (` = 2, 4, 8) the time to convergence reduces approximately
by a factor of 1/`.
Interactions on social networks. These can be incorporated by postulating that the proba-
bilities ψij of i choosing j depend on i:
∆xi =
1
n
∑
j 6=i
ψij∑
k 6=i ψik
αiβj(xj − xi), (S8)
where ψij is the adjacency matrix specifying the social network. Matrix S loses the nice shape but
the system remains linear. Figures 1.18,1.19,1.20 show the dependence of τ on parameters in
different networks.
Fair leaders. Figure 1.21 is analogous to Figure 1.6 of the main text but explores a wider
range of parameters.
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Figure 1.8: Comparison of approximation (S3b) with numerical results. Parameters αi, βi are chosen randomly and
independently from a uniform distribution on the interval 0.5±∆β . Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform
distribution on the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations;
200 runs for each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4),
blue squares (n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.9: Comparison of approximation (S5) with numerical results. Parameters αi, βi are chosen randomly and
independently from a uniform distribution on the interval 0.5±∆β . Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform
distribution on the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations;
200 runs for each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4),
blue squares (n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.10: Comparison of approximation (S3b) with numerical results. Parameters αi are chosen randomly and
independently from a uniform distribution on 0.5±∆α. βi are fixed at the values shown on the graphs. Initial preferences
are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the
diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to
different points: green circles (n = 4), blue squares (n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange
asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.11: Comparison of approximation (S6) with numerical results. Parameters αi are chosen randomly and
independently from a uniform distribution on 0.5±∆α. βi are fixed at the values shown on the graphs. Initial preferences
are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the
diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to
different symbols: green circles (n = 4), blue squares (n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange
asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.12: Comparison of approximation (S3b) with numerical results. All αi and βi are drawn from uniform
distributions on 0.5±∆α and 0.5±∆β , respectively. Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution
on the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for
each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4), blue squares
(n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.13: Comparison of approximation (S6) with numerical results. All αi and βi are drawn from uniform distri-
butions on 0.5 ±∆α and 0.5 ±∆β , respectively. Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on
the interval (0,1) and all ρi = 1/n. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for
each parameter combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4), blue squares
(n = 8), purple diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.14: Comparison of approximation (S4) with numerical results. All αi and βi are drawn from uniform distri-
butions on 0.5 ±∆α and 0.5 ±∆β , respectively. Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on
the interval (0,1) and reputation values ρi are chosen randomly from the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with different
concentration parameters γ. When γ is small, most individuals have very low reputation while a few individuals will have
a large reputation. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for each parameter
combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4), blue squares (n = 8), purple
diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). µ = 1.
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Figure 1.15: Comparison of approximation (S7) with numerical results. All αi and βi are drawn from uniform distri-
butions on 0.5 ±∆α and 0.5 ±∆β , respectively. Initial preferences are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution on
the interval (0,1) and reputation values ρi are chosen randomly from the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with different
concentration parameters γ. When γ is small, most individuals have very low reputation while a few individuals will have
a large reputation. The dashed line shows the diagonal. 200 parameter combinations; 200 runs for each parameter
combination. Different group sizes correspond to different symbols: green circles (n = 4), blue squares (n = 8), purple
diamonds (n = 16), red crosses (n = 32), orange asterisks (n = 64). Simulated results were scaled by n; µ = 1.
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Figure 1.16: Characteristic time to consensus for groups with different distributions of reputation with no variation
in personality traits. The lines with circles correspond to γ = ∞ (equal reputations ρi = 1/n), the lines with diamonds
γ = 10 (uniform distribution of ρ), crosses γ = 1, and squares γ = 0.1 (a few highly reputable individuals). 10,000
simulations were run for each parameter combination and initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on
the interval (0,1).
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Figure 1.17: Characteristic time to consensus for groups with ` listeners chosen randomly and independently with
no variation in personality traits. The lines with crosses correspond to ` = 8, the lines with circles ` = 4, diamonds
` = 2, and the squares for one listener per interaction. Results were scaled by `/n. 10,000 simulations were run for
each parameter combination and initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
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Figure 1.18: The average time to reach consensus for random networks where each group member has the same
number of connections (k) and there was no variation in personality traits (α and β). The squares represent the average
time to reach consensus for a complete network, the crosses denote networks with n − 1 connections, the diamond
networks had 8 connections per group member, and the circles had 4 connections per member. Reducing the number
of connections increases the time to reach consensus. 5,000 simulations were run for each parameter combination
with random formation of dyads and initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
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Figure 1.19: The average time to reach consensus for Erdo¨s–Re´nyi networks with different probabilities of connect-
edness and no variation in personality traits (α and β). The squares represent the average time to reach consensus for
a complete network, the diamonds denote networks with probability of connectedness of 8/n, while the circles networks
had a probability of 4/n. A lower probability of connectedness increases the time to reach consensus dramatically but
appears to have a reduced effect for larger group sizes. This could be due to networks having stubborn individuals with
few connections, but larger groups having more interactions per time step mitigate this effect. 5,000 simulations were
run for each parameter combination with random formation of dyads and initial preferences were drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval (0,1).
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Figure 1.20: The average time to reach consensus for preferential attachment networks with no variation in per-
sonality traits (α and β), varying initial complete networks (m0) and number of connections for each additional group
members (m). The squares represent average time to converge for complete networks, the asterisks for the time when
m0 = 8 and m = 4, crosses for m0 = 8 and m = 2, diamonds for m0 = 4 and m = 4, and circles for m0 = 4 and m = 2.
Reducing the size of the initial complete network m0 and therefore reducing the number of highly connected individuals
dramatically increases the time to reach consensus similar to that found when reducing the number of connections with
the other models. 5,000 simulations were run for each parameter combination with random formation of dyads and
initial preferences were drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
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Figure 1.21: Average sampling errors, (x˜i − xopt)2, for individuals attempting to estimate the average initial prefer-
ence xopt by randomly sampling n′ group mates in a group of size n. Individuals are ranked by their relative agreeability
within the group from the lowest on the left to the highest on the right. Individual agreeability was chosen with a uniform
probability from the interval (0,1) and persuasiveness was fixed at 1. 5,000 runs for each parameter combination with
random formation of dyads and initial preferences drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0,1).
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Chapter 2
To play or not to play? That’s a
resource abundance question
33
The following chapter is a reprint of a paper submitted for publication:
Auerbach, J., Kanarek, A. R., and Burghardt, G. M. (in review). To play or not to play? That’s a
resource abundance question. Adaptive Dynamics.
Abstract
Although play occurs in a wide variety of animals, models of the origins of play behavior are
lacking. We propose a novel computational model exploring the evolution of non-social frivolous
play. Asexually reproducing semelparous animals can either rest or forage. Foraging occurs
when an organism is below an energy threshold. Success is determined by the combination of
skill and availability of resources, which declines over time but replenishes for each generation.
Play was introduced as a mutant strategy: a frivolous activity that uses energy, increases the
probability of dying over resting, with no direct fitness benefit. Simulations show that play behavior
becomes fixed in the population and the time spent playing is maintained at a low rate in spite of
its costly nature. When play behavior is directly functional by increasing foraging ability, it evolves
quickly and the time individuals spend playing increases, but eventually the population of players
collapses and play disappears. We suggest a mechanism underlying the origins of adaptive play
from non-adaptive behavior when resources expand. Initially play acts as a spiteful behavior in
that playing individuals suffer a direct cost to their fitness, but also may incur even greater costs to
other individuals in the population.
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Introduction
There have been only a few attempts to model play behavior in the literature (Burghardt, 2005,
Pellis et al., 2015) and no models we are aware of deal with the origins of play and how it could be-
come established in the first place. Progress was hindered by an unclear conception of what play
was, how to identify it, and confusion among different types and complexities of play (Burghardt,
2005). We now have a set of 5 criteria for identifying play in diverse species and contexts, allow-
ing play to be identified in animals ranging from invertebrates (e.g. octopus, spiders, insects) to
members of all vertebrate classes (Graham and Burghardt, 2010, Burghardt, 2014). A recent brief
statement (Burghardt, 2014) is: Play is repeated, seemingly non-functional behavior differing from
more adaptive versions structurally, contextually, or developmentally, and initiated when the ani-
mal is in a relaxed, unstimulating, or low stress setting. Thus, while play is certainly most common
and complex in many mammals (e.g., primates, rodents, carnivores, cetaceans) and birds (e.g.,
corvids, parrots, raptors) the fact that it occurs in diverse and distantly related taxa raises the issue
of the origins of such behavior multiple times over the course of animal evolution.
Another advance was to recognize that play may be classified into three processes, primary,
secondary, and tertiary. Only the first is relevant to the origins issue, as such play is a byproduct of
various factors such as high metabolic energy, boredom, motivational conflicts, incipient (intention)
movements, and other ethological and psychological factors (see Pellis et al. (2015)). Here we use
a very simple system to model the behavior of animals engaged in seemingly nonfunctional, but
somewhat costly, behavior or not doing so, and exploring if and how play becomes established
in the population. While we realize that play behavior can be quite complex, especially social
play, which we ignore in this paper, we hope that by beginning with nonsocial play in simple
systems, more realistic models and research testing hypotheses in more naturalistic contexts will
be fostered. Here we are concerned with attempting to construct models in which play can not only
originate but become established and the time spent playing can be maintained in a population,
even if at a low rate.
We are using as our conceptual source Surplus Resource Theory (SRT) as developed in sev-
eral places over the last decades (e.g., Burghardt (1988, 2005, 2014), Pellis et al. (2015)). Al-
though much attention has been given to resource abundance and foraging, growth, reproductive
rates, and territorial behavior (Fretwell, 1972, Smith and WL, 1982, Dugatkin, 2013, Dugatkin and
Reeve, 2013), little modeling of resources has been done for play behavior (Dugatkin and Bekoff,
2003).
Individual-based models (IBMs) allow for inclusion of a vast array of detail concerning individ-
ual behavior and characteristics in determining population response (Judson, 1994, Grimm and
Railsback, 2005, DeAngelis and Mooij, 2005). They have been particularly important in situations
in which interactions between individuals affect population response, notably when these inter-
actions are affected by spatial aspects of the environment or the interactions depend upon the
characteristics of the individuals involved, such as their size, social status, or genetically influ-
enced behavioral traits such as shyness, boldness, and aggressiveness (Grimm and Railsback,
2005). IBMs are formulated based upon sets of rules for changes in state of individuals, with the
rule set chosen to represent general responses (e.g., to address fundamental questions such as
the nature of spatial patterns that arise from different individual movement rules) or responses of
particular species of interest. In the latter case, rules are chosen from observation and the model
may be evaluated through comparison with field or laboratory data. Dependence of rule sets upon
such data provides one of the challenges to developing IBMs in that available data may be too
sparse to account for the range of possible individual responses. In this case, we develop our
IBM from a theoretical perspective to begin teasing apart primary drivers of the evolution of play
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Figure 2.1: Strategies and their payoffs for the non-player agents.
behavior.
Our initial model is a non-spatial agent-based model where individuals indirectly compete for
a fixed amount of resources in their environment over a given time period. Individuals can rest,
forage or play (given that they have the genetic disposition to do so). Note that play is initially
equated with non-functional but energy consuming behavior. The other behaviors of resting and
foraging are both energy consuming (and have associated mortalities), but foraging leads to en-
ergy acquisition and not just expenditure. Play behavior is introduced as a mutant and can come
in two flavors, frivolous (without any direct benefit) or non-frivolous (having a foraging benefit).
Model
The intent of the model was to explore under what conditions play behavior emerges for a popu-
lation of non-social organisms that spend their time resting, foraging or playing (if they have the
genetic propensity to do so). The model begins with a fixed population size of Non-Player Agents
(NPAs) whose behavior is limited to foraging a limited resource or resting at each time step (t)
(see Figure 2.1). The initial amount of available resources (ρ(0)) is finite in a given reproductive
time period (T ). NPAs start their life cycle with an initial energy level (Ei(0)), will attempt to forage
when their energy reserves fall below a given hunger threshold (Ei(t) < α) or will rest otherwise.
Foraging success (f(t)) at time t is a probability and determined by:
f(t) = β
ρ(t)
ρ(0)
, (1)
where (0 < β < 1) is the foraging ability and ρ(t)/ρ(0) the availability of resources in the environ-
ment at the given time step. This model does not have an explicit spatial component, meaning
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Figure 2.2: Strategies and their payoffs for the player agents.
individuals do not have a location relative to other organisms or with resources. So foraging only
depends on the current amount of resources in the environment and the individuals foraging abil-
ity. A successful foraging attempt results in κ energy gain and a reduction of a resource in the
environment, while resting and unsuccessful foraging result in energy costs, c and φ respectively,
with κ > φ > c > 0. Foraging and resting also have different mortalities, η and ψ respectively, with
η > ψ, as does having no energy, which leads to an immediate death. The hunger threshold is
allowed to evolve until a baseline is established, i.e. the variation in the threshold converges for a
given set of parameter values so that the population is at carrying capacity, and then it is fixed for
the remainder of the simulation. After a given number of time steps the surviving NPAs asexually
reproduce, with fitness as a function of their energy level at the end of their life cycle, and die.
Resources are replenished at the start of the next generation to mimic seasonality.
Play behavior is introduced as a heritable behavior and is modeled with two loci. The first locus
is binary in character and determines whether or not play occurs, while the other is a quantitative
trait that determines how often the individual plays. The life history of the player agents (PAs)
is similar to the NPAs (see Figure 2.2), except that when the PAs are satiated they play with
probability (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1). This play behavior has an energy cost, λ, such that φ > λ, and mortality,
θ, such that η > θ > ψ. Foraging success is now a function of play frequency:
f(t) = [β + (1− β)γpi] ρ(t)
ρ(0)
, (2)
where γ is the parameter that controls how much play behavior effects foraging ability (0 < γ).
Successful foraging for PAs still results in an increase of κ energy.Formulating the model this way
ensures that the the probability of foraging success is between 0 and 1 when 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, but results
in diminishing returns for playing when foragers ability increases. This effect is negligible except
for the unrealistic case when organisms are poor foragers (β  1) and play frequently (pi ≈ 1).
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Table 2.1: Values in bold were used for the simulations used in the results. All combinations of parameter values
were explored. (∗) When γ = 0 that is the case when play does not have a beneficial effect on foraging.
Parameter Description Values
t Time 1, . . . , T
T Reproductive period (i.e., life cycle) 50,100, 1000
N Population size 50,100
α Hunger threshold Emerges from the model
ρ(0) Initial amount of resources 25,50, 100
ρ(t) Resources at time t 0, . . . , ρ(0)
Ei(0) Initial individual energy level 0.25,0.5, 0.75
β Foraging ability 0.25,0.5, 0.75
κ Energy benefit from successful foraging 0.25,0.5, 0.75
c Resting energy cost 0.001,0.01, 0.1
φ Unsuccessful foraging energy cost 0.1,0.25, 0.5
ψ Probability of dying from resting 0.0001,0.001, 0.01
η Foraging dying factor 2,5,10
pi Individual time spent playing instead of resting Emerges from the model
λ Play energy cost 0.05, 0.1,0.25
θ Play dying factor 1,2, 5
γ Play benefit scaling parameter 0∗,1, 10
µ Mutation rate (end effect) 0.001(0.01)
w0 Baseline fitness 1
wi Individual fitness Emerges from the model
s Selection coefficient 0.1,0.01, 0.001
Differences in individual fitness are determined by individual energy levels at the end of the
reproductive period (t = T ):
wi = w0(1− s) + s Ei(T ), (3)
where wi is the fitness of the ith organism, w0 is the baseline fitness for the population and s is
the selection coefficient. Weak selection is imposed (Burger, 2000) wi’s are scaled so that the
initial population size is constant for each generation. Play is introduced as a mutation with all
organisms initially not playing (pii = 0). The play gene is turned on or off through mutation and the
amount of time an individual plays is increased (or decreased) by a mutation effect (µe):
pii = pip ± µe, (4)
where pip is the parental play time and if pii < 0 then pii = 0. Formulating play genetics this way
ensures that even if individuals spend a large amount of time playing (i.e. pii  0), they can
still lose the ability to play by random mutation. To determine the hunger threshold, simulations
were conducted for a given set of parameter values seeded with different hunger thresholds. The
maximum of these values that maintained the population size (i.e., the population survived T time
steps) was used for the main simulations. All simulations were run with MATLAB and the parameter
values explored are found in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.3: Dynamics of the play gene frequency and the play time for a given simulation. Figure (a) shows the
maintenance of a small amount of average time spent playing when not hungry (≈ 10%) in the population when there
is no benefit to foraging success from play behavior (γ = 0).The play gene becomes fixed in the population. Figure
(b) displays the rise and fall of play behavior in the population when there is a foraging benefit associated with the
amount of time an agent plays (γ = 1). yet the play gene cannot be maintained and the population of players collapses.
Parameter values used are found in Table 2.1.
Results
The main result of the model simulations is that frivolous play evolves in a population when there
are ample resources, and that even when there are ample resources, non-frivolous play can only
be maintained (i.e. fixation occurs) in the population for a small set of extreme parameter values
(e.g., a large energy cost to play). For a given set of parameter values the hunger threshold (α)
was allowed to evolve during an initialization period of 1000 generations to ensure that the popu-
lations of Non-Player Agents (NPAs) survived at the end of each initialization period. Results from
these computational simulations show that play can emerge and be maintained in the population
even when play does not have a direct fitness benefit and play has a greater energy cost than
resting (see Figure 2.3(a)). When play does have a benefit, (i.e., the more the organism spends
time playing the better they are at foraging), play also evolves yet cannot be maintained in the
population, even when play gives a small benefit to foraging (see Figure 2.3(b)). Play behavior
becomes more frequent and more variable before it reaches some threshold in the population,
then it disappears and the cycle starts anew (see Figure 2.3(b)).
Different parameter values were explored for the costs of playing (λ), the initial amount of re-
sources in the environment (ρ(0)), foraging ability (β), and play foraging benefit (γ), resulting in
different average play time for the population and frequency of the play gene in the population.
Increasing the cost of play and reducing the amount of resources greatly increased the time that
individuals spent playing yet reduced the average number of individuals that did play in the popu-
lation (see Figure 2.4). When play is maintained in the population, the average amount individuals
spend time playing is very small (pi ≤ 0.05). Initial resource abundance appears to be the most im-
portant parameter for the emergence and maintenance of play in the population (see Figure 2.4).
As play behavior becomes more frequent and play time increases it has a significant impact on
the amount of available resources in the environment over the course of the individual’s life cycle
(see Figure 2.5). Even a small amount of play time reduces the amount of resources available
for the entire population, and therefore reducing the number of successful foraging attempts for
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Figure 2.4: The dependence of play behavior on resource abundance and other parameter values. The vertical axis
gives the average maximum play time in the population (a) or average play gene frequency in the population (b) over
the last 10000 generations and for 100 simulations. Outer axes correspond to different values in the initial amount of
resources for each generation (ρ(0)) and energy costs for playing (λ), while inner axes correspond to different foraging
ability (β) and play benefit to foraging (γ). Simulations were run for 100000 generations and the other parameter values
used are given in Table 2.1.
everyone. This is even more costly for those who do not spend any time playing, since they do
not become hungry as frequent as the players (since the cost of resting is much less than playing)
and fail to take advantage of resources when available. Increasing costs to rest and decreasing
the amount of resources results in less time the organisms play, while decreased resources and
increased cost to resting reduced the play gene frequency despite it still becoming fixed in the
population once it invaded (see Figure 2.3(b)).
There is a strong relationship between play behavior and resource dynamics (se Figure 2.5):
organisms that play use more energy and therefore get hungrier quicker than non-players and
reduce the amount of resources quicker than a population of non-players. There is a non-linear
effect on the depletion of resources, with the amount of time spent playing having a stronger
effect than the proportion of the population who play. When pi > 0.5 the resources are completely
depleted within a few time steps after the generation begins (see Figure 2.5(b)).
Discussion
The results show play evolving and becoming fixed in the population where there is no direct
fitness benefit, while having direct costs of increased mortality and energy use. This implies that
there must be an indirect benefit of play for it to both arise and be maintained in a population. The
bar plots of Figure 2.4 show that resource abundance in the environment is the most important
parameter of the model to explain the emergence of play behavior, followed by the energy cost of
playing. It appears that play acts as a spiteful behavior in that playing individuals suffer a direct
cost to their fitness but also may also incur even greater costs to other individuals in the population
(Hamilton, 1964a,b, 1970).
In this model the relation of play behavior to the amount of resources in the environment is
clear (see Figure 2.5). The mechanism at work seems to be that those individuals who play get
hungrier (i.e. need resources) sooner than those who rest, resulting in them foraging more often
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Figure 2.5: The dynamics of resource abundance in the environment due to the amount of play behavior in the
population. For each simulation a proportion of the population were player agents with a fixed play time. Figure (a)
shows the results for the model without an increased foraging benefit from play behavior (γ = 0), while (b) shows the
results for the model with a play benefit to foraging (γ = 1). As play behavior becomes more frequent and play time
increases it has a significant impact on the amount of available resources in the environment over the course of the
individual’s life cycle. Results were averaged over 100 simulations for each parameter combination (refer to Table 2.1
for the other parameter values used in these simulations).
and more quickly. This reduces the amount of resources available in the environment, leaving the
non-players less likely to effectively forage and resulting in them having fewer offspring. This also
puts an upper limit to how much individuals should play, since they can deplete the environment
too quickly and die. This scenario occurs when there is a direct fitness benefit to play, namely
that the more an individual plays the better at foraging they become. Play evolves more quickly
in the population but then disappears after an arms race to play more and more often results in a
depletion of resources which cannot can’t sustain the population. Thus, it is not only the amount
of resources in the environment, but how quickly the population depletes them. This might explain
why play rarely seems to have a runaway effect. In fact, many human moral lessons point out
that if everyone engaged in nonproductive activities (sports, arts, theatre, religion, video games,
etc.) a society could not be maintained as no organisms would produce the resources necessary
for such otherwise socially and personally enriching activities. Play is, however, both a measure
of freedom and a source of creative achievement (Burghardt, 2014). The irony is that our initially
non-intuitive results from the novel model suggest that play could have originated as a selfish,
even spiteful behavior en route to becoming a socially and reproductively valuable activity.
This model provides a possible key to the puzzle for the evolution of apparently non-functional
nonadaptive behavior. Is this also supported biological? Well, if the playing animals are oper-
ating as if they have a higher metabolic rate, they are overall more active and thus exploiting
environmental resources at a higher rate than the less active animals, and a relationship between
metabolic rate and play has been often proposed and supported (Burghardt, 1984, 1988, 2005).
Future directions for the model include but are not limited to variability in initial resources avail-
ability each generation (to simulate seasonal, environmental variability), social play, competition
between resources (e.g. hawk-dove interactions), and predator-prey interactions. The formula-
tions of this theoretical models offer experimenters and empiricists the opportunity to test these
hypotheses about the relationship between resource abundance and play behavior. The parame-
ters of this model are intuitive and observable for different species, allowing this model’s predictions
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to be verified.
Although highly simplified, we have shown how a costly behavior without any obvious value
can evolve. We recognize that this could apply to nonfunctional behaviors of any type, and our
labeling this behavior as play may seem a sleight of hand. But play has been used as the prime
example of a mysterious, non-serious behavior perplexing scientists as to how it could originate
and become fixed in a population unless it had considerable value to balance its costs. We have
shown that such behavior can evolve in the absence of adaptive value. But once present, play,
if it can result in expanding the resources available (e.g., invading new habitats, creating novel
ways of exploiting resources), may become the avenue for further evolution, an idea supported
elsewhere (Burghardt, 2015). Future model developments identifying the conditions in which this
further evolution can occur are now needed.
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Conclusion
Chapter 1. We show that within-group heterogeneity can significantly delay democratic con-
sensus building. Our results thus imply strong benefits of leadership particularly when groups
experience time pressure and significant conflict of interest between members (due to various
between-individual differences). Overall, our models shed light on why leadership and decision-
making hierarchies are widespread, especially in human groups.
Chapter 2. Simulations show that play behavior becomes fixed in the population and the time
spent playing is maintained at a low rate in spite of its costly nature. When play behavior is directly
functional by increasing foraging ability, it evolves quickly and the time individuals spend playing
increases, but eventually the population of players collapses and play disappears. We suggest a
mechanism underlying the origins of adaptive play from non-adaptive behavior when resources
expand. Initially play acts as a spiteful behavior in that playing individuals suffer a direct cost to
their fitness, but also may incur even greater costs to other individuals in the population.
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